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LAMPADEPHORIA
ON CRITERIA FOR REDISTRICTING
Richard L. Morrill*
The one month effort to reapportion the legislative and congressional districts of the State of Washington1 did not provide an extensive opportunity to probe either the logical human bases for or
methods of reapportionment. However, on the basis of the redistricting
experience and subsequent analysis and reflection, an appraisal of the
generally accepted criteria for reapportionment is appropriate.
Since the constitutional requirement for periodic redistricting on an
approximate one-man-one-vote basis is now well established, 2 the
major remaining issue is the selection of criteria to implement that
standard. The most frequently cited criteria have been3 (1) equal population, (2) compactness, or lack of irregularity or sinuosity, and (3)
use of counties and cities as building blocks. The following criteria
also have been suggested: 4 (4) natural geographic boundaries, (5) integrity of cultural groupings, and (6) political balance (no systematic
bias). As a geographer, I suggest that (4) and (5) would better be ex-

* Professor of Geography, University of Washington; B.A., Dartmouth College,
1955; M.A., University ofWashington, 1957, Ph.D., 1959.
I. The Washington State Legislature has the constitutional mandate to redistrict the
state. WASH. CONST. art. II, § 3. A Seattle attorney, George Prince, filed suit in the
Western Washington District Court requesting that the court appoint a Master if the
Legislature had not acted by February 25, 1972. The court accepted the request, and
when the Legislature failed to meet the deadline, it selected the author from a list of possible Masters.
2. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962). See
generally R. DIXON, DEMOCRATIC REPRESENTATION: REAPPORTIONMENT IN LAW AND
PoLITIcs (1968) [hereinafter cited as DIXON]; Representation and Apportionment,
WASH. CONG. Q. (1966); Bonfield, Baker v. Carr: New Light on the Constitutional
Guarantee of Republican Government, 50 CALIF. L.-REV. -245 (1962); Silva, Reapportionment and Redistricting, 213 SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN 20 (Nov. 1965). The decisions
were not accepted gracefully; an attempt to amend the Constitution to permit states to
determine theii o w'n bases for rejresentation was nearly successful. DIXON at 385-435.
3. DIXON at 217-27, 458-69, 490-99, 516-27; REAPPORTIONING LEGISLATURES: A
CONSIDERATION OF CRITERIA AND COMPUTERS 16 (FL Hamilton Ed. 1966) [hereinafter
cited as Hamilton]; Orr, CongressionalRedistricting: The North Carolina Experience
in STUDIES IN GEOGRAPHY (University of North Carolina 1970).
4. See note 3 supra.

847

Washington Law Review

Vol. 48: 847, 1973

pressed as a mandate for a seventh criterion-meaningful regions.
The Western Washington District Court included the first five criteria
in its Redistricting Order, specifically excluding all political considerations. 5 Legislators may add some less lofty political criteria: (8) minimization of the loss of incumbents, (9) minimum change in districts,
and (10) achievement of partisan advantage.
While focusing on the application of these criteria to the Washington redistricting case, this article examines the merits and means of
implementing these criteria and briefly analyzes the problem of selecting a state agency which can responsibly perform the task of redistricting.
The simple equal population criterion understandably has generated the strongest reaction and comment, since it undermined
long-standing representational biases between urban and rural areas
and lower and upper legislative houses. 6 Although use of the equal
population criterion is now constitutionally required, arguments have
been advanced in favor of disproportionate representation of sparsely
populated rural areas. 7 Large rural areas may experience particular
problems in constructing and maintaining highways, in providing
health and education services or in managing public lands. They may
lack significant internal cohesion, thus making it difficult for one representative to become familiar with his constituency. Such pleas, however, are refuted by the lack of objective evidence that rural areas actually have greater per capita needs than urban areas.
In addition, a seemingly strong and intuitively appealing case against
total reliance on the equal population criterion has been advanced on
the federal analogy that counties are to states as states are to nations.
Since each state, regardless of size, is equally represented in the
United States Senate, why not have equal county representation in

5. Prince v. Kramer, Civil No. 9668 (W.D. Wash., Feb. 25, 1972). For a summary
of earlier redistricting experience in Washington State, see Baker, Tile Politics of Reapportionment in Washington State, in CASE STUDIES IN PRACTICAL POLITICS (1960). See
also R. Teshera, The Territorial Organization of American Internal Governmental Jurisdiction, 194-296, 1970 (unpublished thesis no. 18656 in University of Washington
Library) [hereinafter cited as Teshera]; DIXON at 343-46.
6. Baker, Implementing One-man, One-vote: Population Equality and Other
Evolving Standards of Lower Courts, in NAT'L MUNICIPAL LEAGUE, CONFLICT AMONG
POSSIBLE CRITERIA FOR RATIONAL DISTRICTS (1969).

7.

Israel, Non-population Factors Relevant to an Acceptable Standard of Appor-

tionment, 38 NOTRE DAME LAW. 499 (1963); T. O'RouRKE, REAPPORTIONMENT: LAW,
POLITICS, COMPUTERS (1972) [hereinafter cited as O'ROURKE] ; Teshera at 79-85.
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state senates? States, however, have rarely applied the analogy 8 which
is fundamentally spurious since the federal government was created by
the original sovereign states, the smaller of which exacted the Great
Compromise as the price for ratifying the United States Constitution.9
In contrast, counties are mere administrative creatures of the states
which may be altered readily by the states. Thus, the equal population
criterion must be utilized.
Nevertheless, use of the equal population criterion need not preclude county representation--counties could be given fractional
votes.' 0 Under such a plan, a small county entitled by population to
one-fourth of a senator would elect one man with one-fourth of a
vote. Although mathematically sound, such a plan is generally interpreted to violate the precept of equal representation, since, despite
voting differentials, the many legislators from small counties may
exert undue influence. 1
Since reliance on the equal population criterion is constitutionally
required, ascertaining the acceptable degree of deviation is essential.
This is of real technical importance in the actual demarcation of districts, as well as of conceptual significance in the interpretation of
equal representation. 12 Over the last decade permissible departures
gradually have been narrowed from about 20 percent to the 1 percent
allowed in the 1972 redistricting of Washington State.' 3 Although the
apparent precision of the United States Census suggests that the 1
percent limit should be achieved easily, it was rather difficult in the
Washington case to meet that requirement because many of the
smallest census units (enumeration districts in rural areas; superblocks
in urban areas) had as many as 2,500 people. The indivisibility of the
census units resulted in districts with undesirable, irregular shapes,
and often required the division of counties and cities into more than
8. DIXON at 82-90, 217-29; McKay, Federal Analogy and State Apportionment
Standards,38 NOTRE DAME LAW. 487 (1963).
9. See note 6 supra.
10. Banzaf, Weighted Voting Doesn't Work: A Mathematical Analysis, 19 RuT"
GERS L. REV. 317 (1965); DIXoN at 503-26.
11. WMCA v. Lomenzo, 238 F. Supp. 916, 923 (S.D.N.Y. 1965). Although several

plans involving fractional voting have been disallowed, there has been no precise ruling
on fractional voting.
12. DIXON 439-55, 535-43; O'ROURKE at 31-32; Teshera at 123-55; Kirkpatrick v.
Preisler, 394 U.S. 526 (1969).
13. Prince v. Kramer, Civil No. 9668 (W.D. Wash., Feb. 25, 1972). The I percent

maximum deviation allowed in the 1972 Washington redistricting order permitted a
variation of only 684 people between districts.
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one district. 14 Aside from such inconveniences, this requirement is
excessively stringent for four convincing reasons: (1) the census itself
is not generally considered to be accurate within 1 percent; (2) as
much as 15 percent of the population moves every year; (3) the population eligible to vote varies by up to 20 percent from the total population; and (4) within a few months of the census, long before a redistricting plan is even accepted, the population of many of the census
units changes by more than 1 percent. 15 Due to the prevalence of
census units with populations in excess of 1,000 people, uneven
census accuracy, and the high rate of mobility in the American population, I would recommend that a 3 percent (or even a 5 percent) deviation is more realistic and in accordance with the requirement of
equal representation. Forming districts of precisely equal population
requires accuracy and stability of census data that simply does not
exist. 16 Had the margin of error been 3 percent, the redistricting plan
for Washington could have been esthetically improved, enabling more
regular and compact districts as well as fewer divisions of cities or
with precisely equal popucounties. Further, state legislative districts
7
lations are not constitutionally required.'
A compactness criterion generally is regarded as a major and necessary safeguard against the practice of gerrymandering. 18 The partisan
plans presented in the Washington State Legislature (a Senate Demo14. Blocks and enumeration districts are the smallest areas for which data are collected. Many of these areas are shaped irregularly, and the population distribution
within many districts is not known.
15.
BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS, Series PC 25
(1971-72); BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, MOBILITY FOR STATES AND THE NATION (1972);
BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, PROCEDURAL REPORT ON THE 1960 CENSUS OF POPULATION AND
HOUSING 137-46 (1963); DIXON at 535-43; O'RoURKE at 31-32. For example, in the
years 1967-69, King County may have grown at the rate of 5-7 percent per year,
while between 1969 and 1971 it may have declined about 2 percent per year.

16. The impermanence of the population distribution does not justify prospective
districts, however, as our ability to forecast population changes is simply not good
enough. The problem of indivisible units (see note 14 and accompanying text supra)
does not make it difficult to meet a 1 percent deviation requirement in forming congressional districts.
17. The United States Supreme Court, in a Virginia redistricting case announced
February 21, 1973, upheld a plan in which districts varied by as much as 16 percent.
stating that the precise equality required for congressional districts by the Court in
Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526 (1969), was not meant to apply to state legislative
districts. Mahan v. Howell, 93 S. Ct. 979 (1973).
18. The deliberate arrangement of districts to preserve incumbent representation
and enhance partisan interests is discussed in: Bunge, Gerrymandering, Geography and
Grouping, 56 GEOGRAPH. REV. 256 (1966); Sauer, Geography and the Gerrymander, 12
AM. POL. Sci. REV. 403 (1918); Vickrey, On the Prevention of Gerrymandering,76 POL.
Sci. Q. 105 (1961).
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cratic plan and a House Republican version) had sufficiently elegant
and classic examples of the gerrymander to warrant the Court's prohibition of unnecessary "deviations or sinuosity."' 9 Some proposed districts crossed virtually half the width of the state,2 0 while others consisted of discontiguous or marginally connected regions of the state
and were ingeniously designed to place two incumbents of the same
21
party in one district.
The compactness or regularity of districts can be evaluated by a
few simple measures relating area, perimeter, and maximum and minimum dimensions.2 2 But while it may be necessary to prohibit grossly
irregular districts, I would strongly argue against a simple and mechanical application of a compactness criterion. Requiring circular,
hexagonal or square districts (the most compact forms) is meaningless
if the reality of the transportation network makes travel easier and
faster in a district of a different shape. Thus, a rectangular district
three times as long as it is wide may be the shape which minimizes
travel time for a particular population.2 3 Similarly, some irregularity
of shape may be justified because of the irregularity of topography
and population distribution, or in order to maintain community of
interest to ensure representation of ethnic or racial minorities. Further, compactness alone does not preclude gerrymandering because
uniformly compact districts could be systematically arranged to waste
19. Prince v. Kramer, Civil No. 9668 (W.D. Wash., Feb. 25, 1972). The Legislative
proposals were an engrossed house bill, H.B. 747, 42d Wash. Legis., Reg. Sess. (1972)
(the Republican plan), and a senate amendment to the house bill (the Democratic plan).
The inability of the Legislature to reach a compromise evidently was tied to incompatible arrangements in Spokane and north Seattle. The House plan, for example, concentrated Democratic strength in one inner city district, while the Senate bill created a set
of districts extending from city to county.

20. For example, in the Senate amended bill, the 13th District stretched from suburban Seattle in the west to beyond Moses Lake in the east, and the 8th District extended from Longview to east of Pasco.
21. In House Bill 747, for example, the 13th District, which combined Grant and
Franklin counties, and the 39th District, which barely connected parts of Whatcom,
Skagit and Snohomish counties, both placed incumbents of the opposition party together.
22. Roeck, Measuring Compactness as a Requirement of Legislative Apportionment, 5 MIDWEST J. PoL. Sci. 70 (1961); Schwartzberg, Gerrymahdersand the Notionof "Compactness," 50 MINN. L. REv. 443 (1966). A requirement of contiguity would
constrain partisan manipulation and effective disenfranchisement. Yet theoretically it
can be argued that some discontiguous areas with a common characteristic, such as a
predominant Indian population, should be grouped together to assure some minority
representation.
23. For example, in Washington State, population and transportation are often linearly arranged along certain rivers (as the Yakima, Lewis, and parts of the Columbia).
Seattle's black population is likewise distributed in an oval-shaped, north-south pattern.
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one party's votes by concentrating them in a few districts. 24 Although
it has limitations, a compactness criterion nevertheless may be desirable where used to avoid unnecessary or unreasonable irregularity and
to provide a safeguard against partisan manipulation.2 5
The third criterion, which strives to avoid dividing counties or cities, is unpopular with those who desire ideal, compact, distanceminimizing districts and recognize that their goal is frustrated by
adherence to existing political boundaries. Following county and city
boundaries clearly makes partisan gerrymandering difficult by restricting freedom to combine small census units. Further, preserving
the integrity of counties is a real convenience 26 since much of the
population strongly identifies with cities or counties and elections and
the structure of voter precincts are normally county functions. However, inasmuch as the population of larger counties or cities rarely is
divisible into an even number of districts, and since many city boundaries and populations are changing rapidly, strict adherence to the criterion is impractical. 2 7 On balance, the criterion is reasonable if expressed as a preference rather than a rigid requirement.
A geographer might be expected to be happy with a criterion that
requires district boundaries to follow natural geographic barrierssuch
as mountain ranges or major bodies of water.2 8 Such a criterion, however, should not be rigidly applied. A river may be a unifying force
within its basin rather than a barrier, and bridges across water bodies
may be evidence of strong community of interest. Showing sensitivity
to these factors in the Washington redistricting case, the court noted
the barrier effect of both the Cascades and those parts of Puget Sound
29
which are not linked by ferries or bridges.

24. DiXON at 458-99; A. HACKER, CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICTS (1966); Teshera at
178-86. For example, in a three-district region where party strengths are equal, one
party could dominate two seats by arranging the districts so as to control 60 percent of
two districts while letting opposition control 70 percent of the third district.
25. See text accompanying note 35 infra.
26. Hamilton at 16; Teshera at 85-92.
27. In the Washington redistricting case, the strict requirement of a maximum I
percent deviation forced the division of several counties which could have remained intact in one district if there had been a 3 percent or 4 percent leeway. For example, the
division of Pacific, Columbia, Grant, and Whitman counties would have been unnecessary.
28. Orr, supra note 3;Teshera at 69-78.
29. Prince v. Kramer, Civil No. 9668 (W.D. Wash., Feb. 25, 1972). The engrossed
Senate bill, S.B. 747, 42d Wash. Legis., Reg. Sess. (1972), contained several districts
which crossed the crest of the Cascade Mountains as well as unbridged bodies of water.
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The criterion of maintaining the integrity of cultural groups receives some support from geographers, sociologists, and political scientists, since these social scientists recognize the meaningfulness of
cultural identification.3 0 Although we might desire a more effective
melting pot, many minority groups-blacks, Chicanos, Puerto Ricans, and to a lesser extent some ethnic groups-perceive spatial concentration and group solidarity to be an effective means of gaining
political leverage. Deliberate dilution of such bloc voting on grounds
of cultural integration would create a risk of severe frustration and
unrest. However, in implementing this criterion by creating a district
that is 55 percent black, one is in a crude sense disenfranchising the
45 percent who are white. Nevertheless it is important to remember
that the larger portion of most minority populations are sufficiently
dispersed so as not to constitute a voting majority in their districts,
31
however the districts may be drawn.
A desire to assure minority representation raises the more general
question of whether districts should be more than arbitrary geometric
collections of people, instead possessing some unity, meaning, or
reality in the eyes of the resident. Recognizing that geographers have
long been concerned with identification of objectively distinct regions, 32 it seems reasonable to suggest as a general criterion that each
district should constitute the most meaningful region possible for
those included therein. Unfortunately, this rational proposition currently is frustrated by two somewhat contradictory concepts of the
proper definition of meaningful regions. The first, adopting the integrity of cultural groups criterion, holds that a region should be homogeneous or uniform with respect to factors such as income, occupational structure, land use, and racial or ethnic composition.3 3 The
second, generally preferred by political and economic geographers,
argues that regions should possess functional unity: 34 for example, a
region should encompass a small city as well as its economic hinterland or trade area; it should embrace both a large shopping center
and the section of a city that it serves. Districts of homogeneous social
30.
31.

Hamilton at 47-48; Orr, supra note 3, at 75-90; Teshera at 92-100.
Examples include American Indians, Japanese-Americans, and, except in the

largest cities, blacks.
32. Grigg, Regions, Models, Classes, in MODELS IN GEOGRAPHY (R. Chorley & P.
Haggett eds. 1967); Teshera at 18-49, 101-17.
33. Orr, supra note 3, at 75-90; Teshera at 19-36, 92-117.
34. Id.
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and economic character tend to embody a community of interest
which stimulates homogeneous voting patterns. Considered to be safe,
such districts usually have long-term incumbents who presumably
reflect the views of the majority of the constituency and offer an arguably desirable stability of representation. Districts of a functional
character tend to be more economically and socially diverse, although
united by strong patterns of interaction. Such districts are considered
to be swing districts which elect few long-term incumbents. To maximize responsiveness to the voter, one may argue that it is desirable to
create as many swing districts as possible. Attempts to create districts
which are both functional and culturally homogeneous areas arguably
should produce regions which are fairly meaningful to the residents
while providing a mix of safe and swing districts.
As indicated above, it is theoretically possible to form districts
which meet equal population and compactness criteria yet reflect systematic bias in favor of one party by concentrating opposition
strength in as few districts as possible. The history of gerrymandering
suggests that a criterion of political balance is plausible. 35 Simple tests
of imbalance are available, such as comparing a party's portion of the
total vote with that party's proportion of elected representatives.3 6
Given observed concentrations of party loyalty,3 7 achieving political
balance in Washington would mean that perhaps as much as one-half
of the available seats are likely to be consistently partisan, while the
others are likely to be swing seats of inconsistent and uncertain political complexion. However, the court in Prince v. Kramer38 was wise
in not formally recognizing the political balance criterion. To do so
would have increased tremendously the effort of redistricting due to
the need to analyze several sets of election returns for areas generally
incompatible with census population units. 39 Any person is free to at-

35. DiXON at 485-99; Hamilton at 30-31.
36. Another test is comparing the coefficients of concentration, which measure the
degree of divergence from equal or proportional strength within districts.
37. For example, in Washington State, although party loyalty is rather weak, inner
city districts and rural areas dependent on forest products tend to be safely Democratic
districts, while suburban areas and rural areas with large-scale agriculture tend to be
safely Republican.
38. Civil No. 9668 (W.D. Wash., Feb. 25, 1972).
39. Precinct boundaries rarely correspond to census enumeration district boundaries. The Senate Amended House Bill, H.B. 747, 42d Wash. Legis., Reg. Sess. (1972).
extrapolated precinct populations and had to be redefined in terms of census units.
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tack a redistricting plan believed to be systematically partisan.4 0 If all
political variables are proscribed, however, as in the Washington case,
then the expectation is that districts constructed on the basis of population and location will turn out to be politically balanced-that is, an
equal number of districts will be biased in each direction. This expectation was fulfilled by the new Washington apportionment.4 '
The question of who should carry out reapportionment raises some
problems of a different sort.4 Although ideally the Washington court
should not have been compelled to be responsible for reapportionment
nor should one person have prepared the plan, extreme urgency
compelled imposition of severe constraints 4 3 Nevertheless, although it

is absurd and unfair to expect a body like a legislature to redistrict itself easily or objectively, the Washington State Constitution gives this
responsibility to the legislature." One solution would be for the Legis-

40. While some state courts have granted relief from obviously partisan plans, the
United States Supreme Court has never done so. Systematic disenfranchisement on the
basis of race, however, has been disallowed. Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 434 (1965);
Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 52 (1964). See DixoN at 510-20.
41. The Washington plan was attacked on the basis of political imbalance. For
example, a Spokane city district tended to concentrate Democratic strength. However,
the redistricter had no knowledge of this concentration when the plan was drawn, and it
appears there was an equal number of partisan districts for each of the two parties. The
obvious political goals of minimizing loss of incumbents and achieving partisan advantage can hardly be avoided when the Legislature undertakes to redistrict itself. If the
task becomes the responsibility of the judiciary or an independent commission, then
these criteria are inappropriate. However, arguably, some effort should be made to minimize changes in districts once they have been established. To the degree that voters
identify with a given district and participate in the political process with respect to issues of significance to that district, it may be desirable to avoid unnecessary alteration
of the political map.
42. DIXoN at 363-79; Hamilton at 49-55. It is possible to argue that human bias can
be avoided by reliance on a computer, but some bias is unavoidable in programming
the computer and selecting the data. Although a computer may have been able to
provide fairly good plans for congressional districts (only seven exist in Washington), it
could not produce a comparable plan for state legislative districts (forty-nine in Washington). As a specialist in precisely this kind of computer programming, I believe that
the computer should be viewed mainly as an aid to a solution rather than as the solution
itself. Since very few local variables can be considered by an operational computer program, computer solutions tend to be too simple. See DIXON at 527-34; Gearhart &
Liittschwager, Legislative Districting by Computer, 14 BEHAVIORAL Scr. 404 (1969);
Hamilton at 96-124; Hess & Weaver, Nonpartisan PoliticalRedistrictingby Computer,
13 OPERATIONS RESEARCH 998 (1965); Nagel, Simplified Bipartisan Computer Redistricting, 17 STAN. L. REV. 863 (1965); O'RouRK at 73-98; Savas, A Computer-based
System for Efficient ElectoralDistricts, 19 OPERATIONS RESEARCH 135 (197 1).
43. Familiarity with the State of Washington enabled me to redistrict Washington
within the one month allotted for the actual redistricting effort. Out of state consultants,
although perhaps unbiased, would have had great difficulty in forming districts which
were meaningful to the residents within the time available.
44. WASH. CONST. art. II, § 3.
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lature to delegate this responsibility to a commission, reserving for itself only the power to accept or reject the plan or suggest modifications. More drastically, the task could be assigned to the state supreme
court or a special outside bipartisan commission perhaps appointed by
the Governor or the state supreme court. It could consist of four
members, evenly split between the parties, and might include one geographer, one political scientist, one sociologist/demographer and
one planner: the first, for his professional concern with regions and
familiarity with maps and census material; the second, for his general
knowledge of political behavior; the third, for his concern with social
grouping and population characteristics; and the last for his experience with practical applications of theories and principles. Requiring
these four to agree unanimously on any plan would, I think, guarantee
45
a quality plan.
To summarize, I would recommend (1) a slight relaxation of the
equal population criterion to perhaps 3 percent (at least for legislative
districts); (2) retention of compactness, integrity of counties and cities,
and natural geographic barrier criteria to be applied without excessive rigidity; (3) a meaningful region criterion, again avoiding inflexible application; and as a lesser priority, (4) a minimization of unnecessary changes in present district form. 46 A political balance criterion
is reasonable in evaluating a plan, but is impractical in preparing a
plan.

45. A few bills were introduced into the 43d Legislature in 1973 suggesting a bipartisan redistricting commission, which would act either initially or after a defined period
in which the Legislature could consider redistricting. Si. Res. 125; H.B. 709; H.J. Res.
23, 43d Wash. Legis., Reg. Sess. (1973).
46. See note 41 supra. In redistricting Washington, I sought to minimize the
number of voters switched to new districts. This objective was obviously hindered by the
dramatic changes in population between 1960 and 1970 which required the shifting of
two legislative districts from eastern to western Washington, elimination of two districts
in the central city of Seattle, and creation of four districts in the suburban areas surrounding Everett, Seattle, and Tacoma.
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